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 Abstract 
Political scientists have been concerned about the loss of power of national parliaments 
through the shift of competences to the EU level. In this respect the Danish system of 
parliamentary scrutiny has been recommended as being highly effective. In this paper, we 
explain why the Folketing issues negotiation mandates on some EU law proposals whereas 
the government can freely chose its negotiation position on other proposals. Our empirical 
analysis of Danish scrutiny decision between 2006 and 2008 uncovers three answers. First, 
in contrast to other scrutiny measures, most of which can be initiated by single party groups, 
the issuance of negotiation mandates is a collective decision. Specifically, it requires the 
consent of a majority of deputies in the Folketing. As a consequence, the position of the 
minority government must win the support of a third party. This third party tends to requests a 
negotiation mandate if it fears that collusion between the government and its international 
partners might violate its interests. Second, the leading minister requests a negotiation 
mandate if a majority of Danish parties stand united against an adverse majority in the 
Council. Third, the coalition partner requests a negotiation mandate to control the leading 
minister in case of significant intra coalition dissent
1
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I.  Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has been accused of suffering from a democratic deficit. One of 
the arguments underlying this accusation is the increasing discretion on the part of national 
governments who in highly non-transparent Council meetings decide policies which 
subsequently are binding on the national level. Only in the case of directives do parliaments 
ex post have the possibility to influence policy within a prescribed range. Therefore, the 
accountability of governments has decreased as a result of an increasing number of policy 
areas shifting to the EU level. The limited transparency of Council decision making increases 
the information deficit of the domestic opposition, who find it difficult to assess the set of 
politically-feasible policy alternatives. From a normative perspective, this extension of 
governmental discretion calls for additional forms of parliamentary scrutiny.  
On first sight the normative problem increases in cases of minority government. Within the 
realm of domestic politics, minority governments depend on third parties to pass legislation. 
In this respect Europeanization threatens to undermine the basic requirement for democratic 
government, namely the majority principle. In countries that regularly experience minority 
government we often find additional institutional safeguards to ensure the government’s 
responsibility in EU politics. In contrast to studies that compare different institutional designs 
(Bergman et al. 2003), we raise the question of why some EU law proposals are scrutinised 
by parliamentary committees whereas others go unchecked. More specifically, we answer 
this question for the scrutiny mechanisms applicable in the Danish Folketing which can limit 
governmental bargaining discretion by specifying a negotiation mandate.  
The literature on parliamentary scrutiny of national legislation provides two prevalent 
arguments. Firstly, compared to parties in the opposition, the government in general – and 
the leading minister in particular – hold superior information on any specific law proposal. 
Hence, the opposition has a motivation to reduce this information asymmetry by means of 
parliamentary scrutiny (Döring 1995; Müller and Strøm 2000; Powell 2000). Secondly, 
parliamentary scrutiny is used to reduce the information asymmetry between the leading 
minister and her coalition partner (Huber and Shipan 2002; Martin and Vanberg 2004).  
However, these approaches have been developed for domestic politics and neglect the 
opportunities and incentives available to parliamentary parties in EU politics. As a 
consequence, existing theoretical approaches have to be adapted to account for 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU law proposals. Accordingly, we consider the strategic interaction 
between the domestic and European levels of government. In this respect the scrutiny in the 
Danish Folketing differs from the German and Czech systems analysed in Finke and 
Dannwolf (2011). In the latter cases, a single party group can refer to EU documents to be 
scrutinized by parliamentary committees. By contrast, parties representing a majority of 
deputies in the Danish Folketing can veto any proposed negotiation mandate. As a 
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consequence, minority governments depend on third-party support. They either form issue-
specific coalitions with alternating partners or count on the implicit support of one and the 
same third-party. Subsequently, we elaborate the theoretical argument presented by Martin 
and Vanberg (2004), which we adopt to the two-level character of EU politics. Our findings 
suggest that scrutiny becomes all the more likely in case the leading minister is politically 
close to his international partners. Coalition partners request a negotiation mandate to avoid 
collusion between the leading minister and his international partners.  By contrast, the very 
same international partners render domestic control superfluous in case their position differs 
from the one represented by the leading minister. In this situation, the leading minister may 
request a negotiation mandate to strengthen the Danish bargaining position in the Council 
This paper continues by summarising the existing literature on the role of national 
parliaments in EU politics. The following section adapts existing, party-centred theoretical 
approaches to the two-level character of European Union politics. Here, our primary focus is 
on the potential effect of requesting a negotiation mandate on the policy outcome.  In doing 
so, we resort to the Schelling conjecture which claims that governments are able to improve 
their bargaining position in Brussels by pointing towards domestic political constrains. The 
paper continues with an empirical test of our hypothesis using data on Danish scrutiny 
activities between 2006 and 2008. We conclude by discussing our empirical findings. 
 
I H S — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — 9 
II.  The Role of National Parliaments in EU Politics 
The deepening of European integration has been accompanied by concerns about 
democratic legitimacy. These concerns were met by an increasing parliamentarisation of EU 
politics. Beside the well-known empowerment of the directly elected EP, the role of national 
parliaments in European policy formulation has been strengthened in various ways (Auel 
2007, Norton 1995). First, national parliaments have increased their cooperation on the 
supranational level via institutionalised meetings. Importantly, the ―Conference of Community 
and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the EU‖ (COSAC) has been recognised 
officially in protocols to the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaty (Krekelberg 2001). 
Second, cooperation between national parliaments and the EP has improved the amount of 
information available to members. Examples of such mechanisms include bilateral 
committee meetings (Maurer and Wessels 2001: 458-460), the establishment of offices of 
national parliaments at the EP (Neunreither 2005) and participation of MEPs in European 
Affairs Committees (Raunio and Hix 2000: 157). Third, the amount of information available to 
national parliaments has been strengthened by European treaty revisions as well as by the 
so-called Barroso Initiative. As of September 2006, the European Commission has 
forwarded all its communications and proposals to national parliaments on (European 
Commission 2008: 2). At the domestic level, the additional supply of EU documents has 
been met with significant improvements of parliamentary scrutiny systems that aim at 
exerting control over the government in the European legislative process (e.g. Raunio and 
Hix 2000; Maurer and Wessels 2001).  
The literature on Europeanisation of national political systems (for an overview refer to Goetz 
and Meyer-Sahling 2008) discusses the role of national parliaments during the making and 
implementation of EU law. Comparative empirical studies find that EU law rarely affects more 
than 30% of domestic legislation (Mueller et al. 2010). Yet this number hardly serves justice 
to the importance of EU law for national politics. Firstly, EU regulations and decisions are 
directly binding and do not require transposition to national law in contrast to directives. 
Secondly, national parliaments may be involved during the implementation stage to help in 
solving intra-coalition disagreement (Franchino and Hoyland 2009), yet the majority of EU 
directives are implemented via governmental decrees (e.g. König and Mäder 2007; König 
and Mäder 2008; Raunio and Wiberg 2010; Mueller et al. 2010). The limited influence of 
national parliaments once European policies have been adopted highlights the relevance of 
parliamentary scrutiny during the European legislative process.  
European Affairs Committees (EACs) can be regarded as the ―most important institutional 
innovation connecting the national Parliament to supranational decision-making‖ (Bergman 
et al. 2003: 174). The institutional setup and activities of EACs vary across member states 
and parliamentary chambers. Often EACs are the corner stone of a larger scrutiny system 
that includes sectoral committees. The committees’ powers for limiting the discretion of a 
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national government in the Council of Ministers vary, too. Most parliaments are limited to 
issuing a non-binding scrutiny reserve. Few parliaments have the right to issue a binding 
mandate that limits the minister’s discretion in the Council. For example, the Danish 
Folketing can issue voting instructions to the minister (Raunio 2005: 322-323)
2
.  In any case, 
given qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, the actual effect of such mandatory 
systems on EU policies remains highly questionable. The effectiveness of parliamentary 
scrutiny systems depends on the available resources such as the number of administrative 
staff, the size and composition of the EACs (Bergman et al. 2003), the density of informal 
contacts to MEPs (Maurer and Wessels 2001), and the close cooperation with sectoral 
committees (Raunio 2005). Behavioural assessments of scrutiny activities are often based 
on aggregate indicators such as the frequency of EAC meetings, the opinions produced, 
number of meetings with EP committees, and memoranda received by the government on its 
positions (Karlas 2011). Although the categorisations differ slightly, Denmark and Finland 
emerge as having the strongest scrutiny system; Greece, Portugal, and Spain clearly rank 
last, indicating a north-south divide that corresponds to the implementation records 
(Bergman 1997; Bergman et al. 2003; Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005).  
Another branch of the literature deals with explaining the genesis of the observable cross-
country variation in scrutiny provisions. Turning to empirical findings, Raunio (2005) and 
Karlas (2011) find that strong parliaments
3
 tend to establish strong scrutiny systems. This 
effect is stronger in the presence of a eurosceptic
4
 public (Raunio 2005). The evidence for 
the effect of minority governments is mixed. Although Raunio (2005) does not find an effect, 
others explain the exceptionally strong scrutiny system in Denmark with the presence of 
minority governments, the stability of governmental coalitions, and the salience that 
governments attribute to EU politics (Pahre 1997; Bergman 1997; Saalfeld 2005).  
Other authors point to the fact that an assessment of formal powers and resources does not 
suffice to evaluate the role of national parliaments in EU politics (Auel and Benz 2005; 
Holzhacker 2002). Based on a typology developed by Döring (1995), Holzhacker (2002) 
highlights the importance of the strategic interaction between party groups and the leading 
ministers. The leading minister might not pay attention to party groups at all (non-party 
mode), interact with members of other party groups (inter-party mode), or act across party 
boundaries (cross-party mode). According to Auel and Benz (2005: 389), parliamentarians 
find themselves in a dilemma between strictly scrutinising the government and optimising the 
policy outcome in the Council of Ministers. By tying the hands of the responsible minister too 
close, MPs from the governing parties risk a worse bargaining outcome (Auel and Benz 
2005: 373). To overcome this dilemma they cooperate informally with the responsible 
                                                     
2
 For an overview of the member states, please refer to COSAC 2008: 26; Bergman et al. 2003; and Raunio 2005. 
3
 A strong parliament is defined by two criteria in the study of Raunio (2005) for the EU 15: agenda-setting power 
and attractiveness to lobbyists. Karlas uses an index for participation rights in his study on the new member 
states. 
4
 Euroscepticism is measured by the good-bad-benefit question in the Eurobarometer (Raunio 2005: 332). 
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ministries, thereby withholding information from the opposition and avoiding formal scrutiny. 
By contrast, opposition parties can make use of informal contacts to European actors (Auel 
and Benz 2005: 388). Holzhacker (2002: 470) finds that German and Dutch opposition 
parties tend to initiate scrutiny over issues that are salient for the public.  
To sum up, most of the existing literature compares the institutions for parliamentary 
oversight of EU lawmaking across member states and across history. Yet, our knowledge on 
the effect of these different institutions with respect to observable scrutiny activities is still 
limited. As pointed out by Benz (2005: 519), more studies are needed ―to find out in which 
way they [national parliaments] make use of their power and how their strategies are 
affected by different institutional conditions or parliamentary democracy‖. Specifically, neither 
of the existing empirical studies explains why some EU proposals are scrutinised by 
parliamentary committees whereas others go unchecked. The paper proceeds by adapting 
theories developed for parliamentary scrutiny of domestic legislation to the bicameral and 
two-level nature of EU politics. 
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III.  Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Proposals in Denmark 
In parliamentary democracies, the oversight instruments have long been considered to be 
less powerful than in presidential systems (Strøm 2000). Nevertheless, numerous studies 
point towards the existing information asymmetry between the government and parliaments 
in Europe (e.g. Saalfeld 2000; Müller 2000). In combination with conflicting political interests, 
information asymmetries may cause ministerial drift. Correspondingly, we find more or less 
developed ―monitoring and reporting requirements‖ of the leading minister (Kiewit and 
McCubbins 1991: 31-33; Saalfeld 2000: 362-369). In the majority of EU member states 
scrutiny systems are ―document based‖ in the sense that the EAC is provided with all official 
EU documents and selects those documents (usually political initiatives and law proposals) 
which it intends to refer for further scrutiny to the committees. Committees are composed of 
policy experts qualified for catching up on any agents’ information advantage (Harfst and 
Schnapp 2003). Moreover, committees themselves hold broad investigative powers, 
including the right to schedule hearings, call witnesses, and subpoena relevant documents 
(Martin and Vanberg 2004; Powell 2000: 32; Strøm 1990: 71). In almost all European 
parliaments the composition of committees reflects the partisan composition of the plenary. 
Although in many cases the formal rules of procedure reserve the agenda-setting right for 
the committee chair, each party group holds powers that guarantee them an informal say 
over the agenda. For example, in the German Bundestag each MP can interpellate the 
government and each group can propose motions for resolution in plenary. Accordingly, in 
most national parliaments party groups are the relevant actors empowered to initiate 
scrutiny. 
In this paper, we deal with a rare type of scrutiny mechanism which provides the EAC with 
the power to limit governmental bargaining discretion by specifying a negotiation mandate. 
Please not that mandating systems differ from document-based systems in one key aspect: 
In document-based systems each party group can refer a document to the EAC for further 
scrutiny. By contrast, a mandate requires a collective decision which must (implicitly or 
explicitly) be supported by a majority of MPs. This rule creates obvious challenges for a 
minority government. The possibility to grant such mandates can be found in eight member 
states including all three Nordic member states, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Poland (only Sejm) and Lithuania (Open Europe 2010; COSAC 2007). The effectiveness of 
these mandating systems depends on government’s formal ability to deviate from the 
mandate granted as well as on the political consequences of such a deviation. In this 
respect, the literature considers the systems in Austria and the Nordic countries as strong, 
whereas in the remaining cases government’s incentives to comply with the mandate are 
rather weak (ibid.). The Danish system is widely considered as the strongest mandating 
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procedure, a peculiarity which supposedly has its roots in the countries tradition of minority 
governments (ibid.; Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005)
5
. 
Following the ―Guidelines for relations between governments and Parliaments on Community 
issues‖ adopted by the COSAC and the European Parliament national governments must 
inform their EACs about all European policy proposals which are either directly applicable or 
the implementation of which would require the participation of the parliament (COSAC 2011). 
The seventeen members of the Danish EAC (Europaudvalegt) mirror the party composition 
of the Danish Folketing. The EAC is responsible for the co-ordination of the cooperation 
between the Folketing and the EU. In doing so, its primary task is to ascertain that the 
position of the Danish government is supported by a majority of MPs in the Folketing 
(Folketing2009a: Section 7 [2]). Obviously, this task is of higher importance for the frequent 
Danish minority government than for the usual majority governments found in most 
parliamentary democracies. 
The Lisbon Treaty extends the parliamentary early warning system on subsidiarity. 
Specifically, it empowers two third of all national parliaments to delay European legislation if 
they share the opinion that the Commission proposal might violate the subsidiarity principle. 
To fulfil this obligation the Folketing’s EAC can draw up memoranda on proposals handled 
under the Codecision procedure. Moreover, the Folketing may scrutinize acts proposed by 
the Commission under any of the three Comitology procedures. However, with respect to 
these implementing or delegating acts the government holds the sole right to initiate scrutiny 
(Folketing 2008: 8). Table 1 presents an overview of the scrutiny procedure applicable in the 
Danish Folketing. 
  
                                                     
5
 Since the Danish accession to the European Community in 1973 only two governments (1993 – 1994; since 
October 2011) had a majority in the Folketing. 
14 — Finke; Melzer / Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark — I H S  
 
Table 1: The Consideration of EU proposals by the Folketing 
Step Procedure 
(1) Policy Proposal by the European Commission or the Council. 
(2) No later than 3 
weeks after the 
proposal has 
been published. 
 
The EAC forwards proposals for consultation in the relevant 
sectoral committee(s). The government prioritizes certain 
proposals for which it sends preliminary basic-cum-subsidiarity 
memorandum to the relevant sectoral committees and the 
EAC. This memorandum includes the government’s evaluation 
of the proposals potential effects on the subsidiarity principle. 
Memoranda are published on the EU Information Centre 
website. 
(3) 
 
No later than 5 
weeks after the 
proposal has 
been published. 
 
The relevant sectoral committees consider the proposal and 
can submit an opinion to the EAC. These Opinions are 
published online. COSAC is notified in case the sectoral 
committee is of the opinion that there are problems in relation 
to the principle of subsidiarity. 
(4) No later than 8 
weeks after the 
proposal has 
been published. 
 
The EAC considers the proposal on the basis of the sectoral 
committee’s opinion, the government basic-cum-subsidiarity 
memorandum, any replies to the web consultation and 
opinions from other parliaments (COSAC). 
In case the opinions from the sectoral committee and the EAC 
differ, a joint meeting is called. If applicable, the EAC’s  
reasoned opinion is signed and published. 
(5) No later than 
one week prior 
to the Council 
meeting 
The EAC considers all issues on the agenda of the forthcoming 
Council meeting in attendance of the minister or a highly level 
bureaucrat. S/he presents the Council agenda and suggests 
deciding on a negotiation mandate for the most important 
proposals. 
(6) Following the 
Council meeting 
The minister reports on the Council meeting. If unsatisfied with 
his report a majority of EAC members can decide a 
memorandum, question the government or request for a 
plenary debate 
  (Source: based on Folketing 2008) 
 
The outstanding feature of the Danish EAC is its right to limit the leading minister’s discretion 
by issuing a binding negotiation mandate ahead of EU-Council meetings (step 5). As a 
prerequisite the government must declare a European issue to be of ―major significance‖ 
(Folketing 2010: 4). In this case, the memorandum drafted by the leading minister includes 
information about the subject, the legal base, the opinions of the European Parliament and 
the Commission, the potential impact on national legislation, on public finances and on 
administration as well as the potential impact on the economy (Folketing 2004). This 
memorandum must be send to the EAC no later than eight days before the respective 
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meeting. During the meeting, the responsible minister proposes the negotiating position of 
the government orally and asks the committee-members for their approval thereof. During 
the debate the committee members deliberate over potential changes of the Danish 
negotiation position. In the end, the chairman of the committee closes the debate when he 
feels that there is no majority (Committee-members whose parties hold more than half of the 
179 seats in the Folketing) against the proposed negotiating position. The agreed position is 
then recorded in a written report, including a description of the leading minister’s discretion to 
deviate from this position. However, this report is not subjected to an explicit vote of approval 
(Folketing 2009b). 
Sectoral committees can scrutinize EU-documents, too (step 3). The list of EU policy 
proposals as well as all governmental memoranda is distributed to all Committees. 
Committee members and the government decide whether the issue should be discussed in 
each respective committee. The EAC members can also decide to delegate proposals for 
further discussion in other, sectoral committees (Folketing 2008: 5). Sectoral committees 
transmit their opinion to the EU-committee which decides on the official standpoint of the 
parliament. In their scrutiny efforts sectoral committees can resort to a broad array of 
instrument. Apart from expert hearings they can question the government in writing or 
summon the responsible minister. However, sectoral committees themselves cannot issue a 
binding negotiation mandate.  
Returning from a Council meeting the responsible minister must submit a written report to 
the EAC in which he summarizes the discussion, decision and voting during of the meeting. 
If left unsatisfied by the report, a majority of the EAC can initiate further scrutiny measures 
(Folketing 2009b). If the law making process is ongoing, a majority of the EAC can formally 
adopt a memorandum in which they demand adjustments of the minister’s position and 
negotiation strategy. However, this follow-up procedure is rarely used (Cosac 2010: 15). 
Besides these explicit scrutiny instruments, the Folketing is characterized by broad 
distribution of initiative and agenda rights. Each MP can (i) question the government either in 
writing or orally and (ii) place an EU policy proposal on the agenda of the plenary. In this 
respect EU proposals are treated like domestic law proposals (Folketing 2009a: § 4 [1]). 
However, this right is mostly exercised by political groups, not least to increase the 
acceptance of the President of the Folketing (Nannestad 2008: 146). (iii) One third of the 
MPs can initiate a referendum. (vi) Finally, a majority of MPs can impeach the government 
with a vote of no confidence. As a consequence, political groups may find it easy to pressure 
the minority governments into requesting a negotiation mandate. 
Overall, the Danish system of parliamentary scrutiny reflects the broad distribution of agenda 
and initiative rights in the Folketing, where the government holds no privileges whatsoever 
(Döring 2001). From an international comparative perspective the right to issue a binding 
negotiation mandate renders the EAC exceptionally powerful. Yet in contrast to document 
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based scrutiny systems, where each political group can demand scrutiny, (Finke and 
Dannwolf 2011), the issuance of a negotiation mandate is a collective decision which 
requires the consent of a simple majority of MPs. On first view this requirement places 
Danish minority governments in a very uncomfortable position. Subsequently, we take a 
closer look on why government or opposition parties may want to request a binding 
negotiation mandate. 
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IV.  Who calls for a Negotiation Mandate? 
In his interviews with German and Dutch MPs Holzhacker (2002) found evidence that 
governing parties initiate parliamentary scrutiny to improve their bargaining leverage in the 
Council of Ministers. The underlying mechanism reflects the so-called ―Schelling Conjecture‖ 
(Milner 1997): ―In international negotiations, the ability of a negotiator to credibly say to his or 
her counterpart that "anything we sign here has to be ratified by my country's legislature" 
provides a bargaining advantage that this person would not otherwise have.‖ (c.f. Tarar 2001: 
320) In contrast to international treaties EU legislation does not require formal ratification by 
national parliaments to become effective. Even when no direct ratification is necessary, 
displeased coalition partners have diverse means for ex-post sanctioning the minister such 
as withdrawing support for the government. Hence, Finke and Dannwolf (2011) conceive of 
the coalition agreement as a domestic constraint. Thus, a reform skeptic (friendly) minister 
may credibly shrink his room for bargaining concessions by pointing towards an even more 
reform-skeptic (friendly) coalition partner. 
While this argument is generally true for all coalition governments, the situation is slightly 
more intricate with respect to Denmark. First of all minority governments depend on the 
support of third parties to pass the majority threshold necessary for any kind of legislation. 
This alters the relationship between government and opposition (Strøm 1990). Specifically, 
parties in office may become prone to blackmailing from third parties whose consent they 
need to pass important pieces of legislation. As a consequence we argue that leading 
ministers can point towards a potential conflict with such third parties to credibly limit their 
room for concessions at the international bargaining table. 
The Danish system of parliamentary scrutiny has institutionalized this mechanism by 
allowing the government to explicitly ask for a negotiation mandate. More precisely, the 
government can pick the mandate to their liking unless it is opposed by a majority of 
committee members. Although we cannot know the exact location of the ―red line‖ defined in 
this mandate, we consider the mere existence of a mandate as a powerful message to 
international partners.  We would expect governmental parties to deploy this mechanism for 
politically important pieces of legislation in which the ―Danish position‖ is relatively united. 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of negotiation mandates increases if the position of the leading 
minister is closer to the third party supporting the minority government than to the expected 
outcome in the Council of Ministers. 
Our second hypothesis takes up the argument by Martin and Vanberg (2004) who find that 
parliamentary scrutiny is also used to reduce information asymmetries among coalition 
partners. Specifically, they argue that the leading minister holds private information on the 
law proposals in his jurisdiction. This can cause ministerial drift in the sense that ministers 
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violate the coalition agreement. The information asymmetry can be mitigated by a number of 
mechanisms such as the nomination of junior ministers from each coalition partner who 
function as watchdogs; the cross nomination of committee chairs and the minister in the 
same jurisdiction; and, most importantly, parliamentary scrutiny. From this perspective, the 
leading minister is the agent and the coalition partners can be seen as his principals. The 
adverse effects of ministerial drift increase with intra-coalition dissent (Martin and Vanberg 
2004: 20). Accordingly, the authors expect that the likelihood of scrutiny increases with intra-
coalition dissent. 
However, similar to Finke and Dannwolf (2011) we argue that any coalition government will 
try to hide internal disputes in policy areas of particular importance to the domestic party 
competition. The costs of presenting the public with a cabinet characterized by internal 
disputes are severe. 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of negotiation mandates increases (decreases) with the dissent 
among the coalition partners in policy areas of little (high) salience to the domestic party 
competition. 
In sum, existing theories assume that either the opposition initiates parliamentary scrutiny to 
reduce governmental drift or one of the coalition partners initiates scrutiny to reduce 
ministerial drift. We apply both arguments to the scrutiny of EU lawmaking by the Danish 
Folketing. Specifically, we establish two hypotheses: First, we suspect that the political 
dissent between the minority government and a third, supporting party decreases the 
leading-ministers likelihood to request a negotiation mandate for politically important law 
proposals.  From this perspective, the minister initiates scrutiny to gain bargaining leverage 
in the Council. Second, we expect that the intra-coalition dissent increases the likelihood for 
the coalition partner to request a negotiation mandate. However, the governmental parties 
refrain from scrutiny over cases characterized by a high salience for the domestic party 
competition. 
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V.  Empirics 
For an empirical test of our hypotheses we use a dataset that includes all European 
legislative proposals and the corresponding parliamentary scrutiny activities for the three 
years from 2006 until 2008
6
. Specifically, we analyze scrutiny activities during the minority 
coalition between the Danish liberals (Venstre) and the Conservative People’s Party 
(Konservative Folkeparti). At the general elections in November 2005 the Venstre gained 
29% and the Conservatives 10.4% of the votes. Together, the two governing parties held 
only 70 of the 175 seats in the Danish Folketing which for the second time elected Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen (Venstre) as Prime Minister. The cabinet comprised a total of 20 ministries, 
14 of which have been led by the larger of the two parties. The most important offices 
attained by the Conservatives were the ministry for economics (deputy prime minister), the 
ministry for justice, the ministry for the environment and the foreign ministry. From the very 
beginning the minority government was dependent on the support of the right-wing Dansk 
Folkeparti which held 24 seats in parliament; hence the three parties commanded a majority 
of MPs. In early 2007 the government began to organize advanced general election to 
enable campaigning under the leadership of Fogh Rasmussen. The results of the November 
election left the fundamental distribution of power in the Folketing unchanged, although the 
Liberals lost 3% of their votes. During our entire period of observation the minority 
government between Liberals and Conservatives depended on the right-wing Dansk 
Folkeparti who turned our very influential with respect to reforming the migration and 
immigration policies. With respect to European integration the Liberals held a moderate 
position, the Conservatives are slightly integration-skeptic, whereas the Dansk Fokeparti 
held, rather unsurprising, a very euro-skeptic position (Hooghe et al. 2010). 
To construct our dependent variable we resort to the IPEX data base
7
 which provides 
scrutiny information at the level of EU documents such as the Commission’s law proposals. 
For every proposal, IPEX includes an entry indicating the history of scrutiny activities in the 
lower and upper chamber of all member states. To validate the information provided by the 
data base, we conducted interviews with the national IPEX representatives stated in the 
database. In Denmark ―scrutiny in progress‖ indicates that the government requested the 
issuance of a negotiation mandate. Based on this information, we define a dichotomous 
variable that is 1 if a mandate has been requested. In total, our data base contains 652 
cases, 341 of which had been handled under the Codecision procedure, the remaining 311 
under Consultation. Overall the government requested a negotiation mandate for roughly 
one third of the cases. Figure 1 indicates that the percentage of requested mandates 
                                                     
6
 The data on the dependent variable has been gathered at the Ruprecht-Karls- University of Heidelberg between 
September 2009 and May 2010. The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance by Dennis Schnur. 
7
 IPEX is an online database provided by COSAC and publicly accessible online: http://www.ipex.eu/ipex/. 
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dropped in 2008. We can only suspect that this drop has its roots in the maintenance of the 
IPEX data base
8
. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of EU Law Proposals subject to Scrutiny in the Danish Folketing 
 
 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the scrutiny activities by policy areas. We derive our 
categorization for policy areas from the responsible committees in the European Parliament. 
Whereas a majority of law proposal fell under the auspice of the Legal Affairs committee, the 
percentage of scrutiny in this area has been relatively low. By contrast, we find a high 
percentage of scrutiny for the areas of agriculture, fishery, environment, research and home 
affairs. Rather low is the percentage of scrutiny in the areas of regional policy, international 
trade, foreign policy, and culture. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8
 Although the responsible administrators did not explicitly confirm our suspicion, the results of our analysis indicate 
no systematic bias. We estimated all models separately for each of the three years. Although the estimated effects 
are stronger in 2006 and 2007, the substantial results do not change. 
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Figure 2: Number of EU Law Proposals under Scrutiny in the Danish Folketing by Policy 
Area. 
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VI.  Independent variables 
In order to measure the position of the parties as well as the salience of the issue to the 
governing parties we use ten questions from the Chapel Hill expert survey on party positions 
carried out in 2006 (Hooghe et al. 2010). We consider the leading EP committee as a proxy 
for a proposal’s policy area. Accordingly, we assign the ten Chapel Hill variables to each of 
the twenty EP committees (see appendix A). Assigning each of the ministries in Denmark to 
one of the EP committees allows us to infer the partisan affiliation and position of the leading 
minister. We approximate the salience of each policy area for domestic party competition by 
the percentage of text parties dedicate to this area in their manifestos. For this purpose we 
resort to the CMP data set and assign suitable quasi-sentences to each of the twenty policy 
areas (Klingemann et al. 2006, Volkens et al. 2010) (see appendix A). 
We approximate the position of the government and the position of the opposition by the 
mean of the respective party positions weighted by its seat share. The conflict between 
government and opposition parties is operationalised by taking the absolute difference 
between these two positions. We measure the length of the legislative reports tabled in the 
European Parliament by counting the words. This word count is primarily a function of the 
number of amendments proposed inside the leading and the advisory committees and can 
therefore be considered a reasonable proxy for a law proposal’s politicization and 
transparency at the EU level.  
We calculate the absolute distance between the minister and its coalition partner to measure 
intra coalition conflict. Likewise we calculate the absolute distance between the party of the 
leading minister and the supporting third party (here: Dansk Folkeparti) to measure the 
dissent between government and the crucial opposition. 
Following Achen (2006) we conceive of the expected bargaining outcome in the Council as 
the weighted mean of the positions of all 27 governments (weighted by their respective Nice-
vote and issue salience). Accordingly, a government’s distance to the expected outcome is 
simply the distance between the position of the leading minister and this weighted mean of 
the position of all 27 governments within the respective policy area.  
In addition, we include three important control variables. First, we add a dummy variable that 
indicates whether a law proposal amends existing EU legislation or implements new primary 
law. Second, we control for the inter-institutional procedures, i.e. consultation or co-decision. 
Third, we control for the type of legal instrument, i.e. directive, decision or regulation. Table 2 
summarizes the descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Scrutiny (negotiation mandate) 578 0.360 0.480 0 1 
Politicization log(word count EP report) 578 7.867 1.463 4.262 11.607 
Codecision (y/n) 578 0.523 0.499 0 1 
Salience (CMP) 578 11.348 7.001 2.310 21.74 
Directive (y/n) 578 0.317 0.466 0 1 
|Minister-Coal.Partner| 578 1.167 0.791 0.018 2.010 
|Minister-Expected Bargaining 
Outcome| 
578 1.414 0.727 0.100 2.42 
|Minister – Dansk Folkeparti| 578 1.685 1.186 0.430 3.631 
 
 
Table 3: Regression Models. 
 Y= Scrutiny (y/n) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  b(se) b(se) b(se) 
Wordcount(log) 0.57*** 0.54*** 0.67*** 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
Codecision(y/n) -0.26 -0.15 -0.04 
  (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) 
Directive (y/n) -0.57** -0.77** -0.74** 
  (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) 
|Minister-Exp. Outcome|   -0.61*** -1.17*** 
    (0.15) (0.26) 
|Minister-DanskFolkeparti|   0.48*** 1.19*** 
    (0.11) (0.21) 
|Minister-Exp. Outcome|* 
|Minister-DanskFolkeparti|   -0.39*** -1.14*** 
    (0.08) (0.19) 
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Salience     0.64*** 
      (0.17) 
|Minister-Coal.Partner|     2.03** 
      (0.62) 
Salience* 
|Minister-Coal.Partner|     -0.27** 
      (0.08) 
_cons -4.77*** -3.72*** -9.00*** 
  (0.55) (0.64) (1.53) 
Number of Cases 611 578 578 
Pseudo R^2 0.10 0.15 0.18 
Log-Likelihood -359.01  -359.01 -317.24 -305.15 
 
We run a series of three logistic regression models (see table 3). The first model is limited to 
control variables. Most of the results turn out unsurprising. The degree of politicization in the 
EP (measured by the report’s wordcount) has a very strong and positive effect on the 
likelihood for requesting a negotiation mandate. Moreover, directives are less likely to be 
scrutinized than regulations and decisions which might be due to fact that parliamentary 
approval is necessary at the upcoming transposition of the directive into national law. Finally, 
the insignificant effect of the Codecision dummy reveals that the legislative involvement of 
the European Parliament has little impact on the likelihood of a negotiation mandate being 
requested. 
The second model tests our first hypothesis which expects that the leading minister has a 
higher likelihood to demand a negotiation mandate if the Danish position is relatively united 
vis-à-vis the majority position in the Council of ministers. The marginal effect depicted in 
Figure 3 supports this expectation: If the position of the minister is far away from the majority 
position of the Council, scrutiny becomes more likely the closer the less dissent between 
Danks Folkeparti and leading minister. However, the results suggest that the underlying 
causality goes both ways: Whereas the minister is more likely to demand a negotiation 
mandate in case of ―national unity‖, the Dansk Folkeparti has a incentive to request a 
mandate if its own position differs from the one of the government and the government is 
located close to the majority position in the Council. In this constellation, the Dansk 
Folkeparti tries to avoid collusion between the government and its international partners by 
issuing a negotiation mandate. 
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Figure 3: Marginal Effect of the dissent between Leading Minister and Dansk Folkeparti on 
the Likelihood for Scrutiny. 
 
 
The third model tests the argument suggested by Martin and Vanberg (2004) according to 
which parliamentary scrutiny provides one means for the coalition partner to control the 
leading minister. Here, we follow Finke and Dannwolf (2011) who find that intra-coalition 
dissent has a positive impact on the likelihood for scrutiny unless the issue at hands is of 
high importance for the domestic party competition and therefore the revelation of intra-
coalition dissent would have a negative bearing on the government’s public support. Figure 4 
provides the corresponding marginal effect plot which supports our second hypothesis.  
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Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Intra-Coalition Dissent on the Likelihood for Scrutiny. 
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VII.  Conclusions 
In this paper we explain why the Danish EAC issues negotiation mandates on some EU law 
proposals whereas the government can freely choose its negotiation position on other 
proposals. We consider the issuance of negotiation mandates as a collective scrutiny 
decision, in contrast to other scrutiny measures which can be initiated by single party groups 
(Finke and Dannwolf 2011). In doing so, the paper claims two contributions to the existing 
literature. First, we contribute to the literature on the democratic deficit in the EU by 
assessing and explaining the empirical extent of parliamentary scrutiny (e.g. Rittberger 2005; 
Follesdal and Hix 2006). In this literature, the Danish scrutiny system is often recommended 
because it supposedly empowers parliaments more effectively than other systems.  Second, 
given the increasing amount and importance of EU legislation, the theoretical and empirical 
advances made in the paper foster a better understanding of the relationship between 
governments and the opposition as well as the relationship among coalition partners in 
minority governments (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2011). 
On the empirical side, the paper analyses the issuance of negotiation mandates during the 
Danish minority government between Venstre and the Konservative Folkeparti from 2006 to 
2008 which has been supported by the right-wing Dansk Folkeparti. On the theoretical side, 
the paper adapts party-centred explanations that had been developed for domestic-level 
scrutiny to the bicameral and two-level nature of EU lawmaking. Our empirical results can be 
summarized as follows: 
First, the most prominent argument suggests that the opposition scrutinizes law proposals 
characterised by a high degree of conflict between the government and the opposition. We 
adapt this argument to EU politics under the Danish minority government. Here, the issuance 
of a negotiation mandate requires the consent of EAC members who represent a majority in 
the Danish Folketing. Therefore, a minority government must find a third party supporting its 
position. During our period of observation this third party was the right-wing Dansk 
Folkeparti. Accordingly, the implicit majority rule causes two classes of opposition parties: 
Those parties which are needed by the government to pass the majority threshold and those 
parties which are unnecessary (and therefore powerless) in this respect. 
Second, following, the literature on two-level games, governments that are represented in 
the Council of Ministers can improve their international bargaining power by strategically 
revealing a credible domestic constraint. The credibility depends on the costs implied by 
violating the constraint. Coalition agreements are one possible constraint because violating 
coalition agreements implies political costs (Finke and Dannwolf 2011). The Danish scrutiny 
mechanism allows for issue-specific coalition agreements in the form of negotiation 
mandates. Therefore, we argue that the relevant coalition agreement is not restricted to the 
parties who are members of the minority government but has to include a third party. Most of 
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the time, the Danish minority government has been supported by the Dansk Folkeparti. Our 
empirical results suggest that the leading minister is more likely to request a negotiation 
mandate if his party is close to the Dansk Folkeparti. 
Third, as a result the Dansk Folkeparti itself can pressure the government into requesting a 
negotiation mandate and does so whenever a) it’s position is far away from the government 
and b) it perceives the danger that the government might collude with its European partners. 
Accordingly, we find that if the leading minister is close to the majority in the Council, the 
likelihood for a negotiation mandate increases in the distance between the party of the 
leading minister and the Dansk Folkeparti. 
Fourth, the Danish case lends support for the Martin-Vanberg-argument according to which 
parliamentary scrutiny is one instrument by which the coalition partner can control the 
leading minister. However, our findings suggest that his effect depends on the issue’s 
importance for the domestic party competition. For low-salience issues, the likelihood for a 
negotiation mandate increases in the intra-coalition dissent. By contrast, the Danish coalition 
partners refrain from revealing their internal conflict in case the issue is highly salient for the 
domestic party competition. 
Political scientists have been concerned about the loss of power of national parliaments 
through the shift of competences to the supranational level. In this respect the Danish 
system of parliamentary scrutiny has been recommended as being most effective. We try to 
qualify this general statement by distinguishing between the powers of the governing parties, 
the supporting third party and the opposition parties. Undoubtedly, the supporting party (here 
the Dansk Folkeparti) benefits most because its consent is often necessary to issue a 
negotiation mandate. Please note that this qualification is not meant to downgrade the 
Danish system in international comparison. In addition to the negotiation mandate, the 
members of the Folketing enjoy similar scrutiny instruments which we find in most other 
national parliaments. Finally, our results for the Danish case indicate that the two most 
powerful explanations for domestic-level scrutiny can be successfully adapted to EU politics. 
Most importantly, scrutiny provides a means for third, opposition parties to control the 
government. Yet, it also provides a means for the coalition partner to exert control over the 
leading minister. 
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IX. Appendix 
Appendix A: Operationalization of Party Positions and Issue Salience 
Policy Area Source: Policy Position Source: Policy Salience 
Foreign Affairs CP 2006, FOREIGN CMP 2004, Internationalism: + 
Human Rights CP 2006, CIVLIB CMP 2004, Freedom & Human 
Rights: + 
Security & Defence CP 2006, FOREIGN CMP 2004, Military: + 
Development CP 2006, FOREIGN CMP 2004, Internationalism: + 
International Trade CP 2006, DEREG CMP 2004, Free Enterprise: + 
Budgets CP 2006, LR_ECON  
Budgetary Control CP 2006, LR_ECON CMP 2004, Market Regulation: 
+ 
Economic & Monetary Affairs CP 2006, LR_ECON CMP 2004, Market Regulation: 
+ 
Employment & Social Affairs CP 2006, LR_GEN CMP 2004; Social Justice: + 
Environment & Public Health CP 2006, GALTAN CMP 2004, Environmental 
Protection: + 
Industry, Research & Energy CP 2006, INTMARK CMP 2004, Technology & 
Infrastructure: + 
Interal Market CP 2006, INTMARK CMP 2004, Free Enterprises: + 
/ Technology & Infrastructure: 
+ Transport & Tourism CP 2006, COHESION CMP 2004, imputed by mean 
of all other policy areas 
Regional Development CP 2006, URBAN / 
INTMARK / LR_GEN 
CMP 2004: Farmer, Social 
Justice 
Agriculture CP 2006, URBAN CMP 2004, Farmers: + 
Fisheries CP 2006, URBAN CMP 2004, Farmers: + 
Culture & Education CP 2006, GALTAN CMP 2004, Education 
Expansion: + 
Legal Affairs CP 2006, CIVLIB CMP 2004, Law & Order: + 
Civil Liberties & Justice CP 2006, CIVLIB CMP 2004, Law & Order: + 
Constitutional Affairs CP 2006, EP CMP 2004, European 
Integration: + 
Women’s rights CP 2006, GALTAN CMP 2004, Non-economic 
Demographic Groups: + 
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